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ABSTRACT 
Two studies investigated changes in eyewitness 
identification confidence after an identification has 
been made. In Experiment 1, thefts were staged 70 times 
for pairs of unsuspecting eyewitnesses (total n = 140). 
Before campus security arrived, witnesses were 
separated and attempted identifications of the thief 
from a target-absent photospread. Biased instructions 
were used to induce false identifications. The 96% who 
made false identifications were then randomly assigned 
to one of 9 conditions telling them of the alleged 
identification decision of their co-witness. Witnesses 
were told that (a) the co-witness identified the same 
person, (b) the co-witness identified a different but 
plausible other person, (c) the co-witness identified 
an implausibly different person, (d) the co-witness 
rejected the photospread, or (e) the witness was told 
nothing about the co-witness's decision. In addition, 
some witnesses who were told that the co-witness 
identified the same person were later told that the 
information was incorrect and that the co-witness had 
actually identified a different person or were told 
that it was not known who the co-witness identified. 
iv 
As well, some witnesses who were told that the co-
witness had identified a different person were later 
told that the information was incorrect and that the 
other witness had actually identified the same person 
or were told that it was not known who the co-witness 
identified. Following the co-witness information 
manipulation, a campus security officer questioned 
witnesses about their identifications of the thief. 
Compared to the no-information control condition, co-
witness agreement produced a robust inflation of 
certainty whereas co-witness disagreement produced a 
precipitous decline in certainty. With one exception, 
correcting the co-witness information did not eliminate 
the confidence-inflating and deflating effects of the 
original information, indicating a strong perseverance 
effect. In the second experiment, subject-jurors 
(n = 378) viewed the testimony videotapes and evaluated 
the credibility of the witnesses. Subject-jurors' 
ratings of perceived credibility were influenced by the 
type of information witnesses had received in a pattern 
that generally paralleled the results of Experiment 1. 
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INTRODUCTION 
How do people decide whether to believe an 
eyewitness's identification testimony? A recent survey 
suggests that 56% of jurors believe that eyewitness 
confidence is a good indicator of testimony accuracy 
(Brigham & Bothwell, 1983). A witness's perceived 
confidence in testifying has been shown to be the 
primary cue that people use to judge eyewitness 
credibility (e.g., Wells, Lindsay, & Ferguson, 1979; 
Lindsay, Wells, & Rumpel, 1981). Consistent with this 
notion of the confident, thus accurate eyewitness, the 
United States Supreme Court has ruled that confidence 
should be used to infer testimony accuracy (Neil v. 
Biggers, 1972). 
This trust in eyewitness confidence seems to be 
misplaced. The general consensus is that accuracy of 
testimony and confidence are poorly calibrated (e.g., 
Deffenbacher, 1980; Leippe, 1980; Wells & Murray, 
1983, 1984). For example. Wells et al. (1979) 
videotaped cross-examinations of eyewitnesses to 
staged thefts and subsequently presented the 
videotapes to subject jurors, asking them to judge 
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whether they believed the witnesses had correctly 
identified the criminal or not. Subject jurors relied 
heavily on eyewitness confidence to make their 
decisions, and equally believed eyewitnesses who had 
correctly identified the criminal and witnesses who 
had mistakenly identified an innocent suspect. So, 
people are relying on a risky assumption in taking 
their cue from the witness's expressed confidence in 
his or her identification decision. 
It has been argued that the eyewitness 
identification problem is not a problem of false 
identifications per se but rather one of "credible" or 
"persuasive" false identifications (Wells et al., 
1979). Hence, the danger is that an eyewitness who 
makes a false identification might also have a firm 
belief that she or he has identified the actual 
culprit; it is the combination of false identification 
testimony plus a confident belief in its validity that 
creates the potential for miscarriage of justice. 
Research on the confidence-accuracy relation has been 
important, therefore because of what it indicates 
about the likelihood that high confidence and false 
identification will co-occur. 
The current research is concerned only indirectly 
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with the confidence-accuracy relation. Instead, the 
primary concern is with the effects of social 
influence on eyewitness identification confidence. In 
particular, the central question is how social 
information that is obtained after an eyewitness has 
made an identification affects the confidence that the 
witness holds in that identification. To address this 
question, the lineup task in the first experiment was 
structured to yield only false identifications. Post-
identification information was then provided to 
witnesses. The effects of the information on 
eyewitness confidence were assessed. Given the 
importance of eyewitness identification confidence as 
a primary determinant of the perceived credibility of 
an eyewitness, it is critical to understand the ways 
in which events that occur after an identification is 
made affect the certainty with which that testimony is 
given. 
Moderators of the Accuracy-Confidence Relationship 
Recent research has sought to develop an 
understanding of the factors moderating the 
confidence-accuracy relationship and the processes 
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through which eyewitness accuracy and confidence 
develop. An important goal was to identify the 
conditions that foster or inhibit the accuracy-
confidence relationship in order to help judges and 
jurors distinguish between accurate and inaccurate 
identifications. Notable theorizing in this area, 
first advanced by Deffenbacher (1980), concerns an 
"optimality" hypothesis. 
According to Deffenbacher, the confidence-
accuracy relationship is moderated by the quality of 
the encoding conditions existing at the time an 
eyewitness observes a crime; the better the encoding 
conditions, the stronger the accuracy-confidence 
relationship. Although intuitively appealing, the 
optimality hypothesis has received little empirical 
support. For example, Lindsay et al. (1979) varied 
witnessing conditions and determined that changes in 
eyewitness accuracy were not associated with changes 
in eyewitness confidence nor with the magnitude of the 
confidence-accuracy relation. In this study, 
eyewitness accuracy was varied by exposing subject-
witnesses to a staged theft under one of three types 
of viewing conditions that varied in terms of how good 
a view they afforded of the thief (e.g., varying such 
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factors as the amount of viewing time and whether or 
not the thief wore a hat that masked his hair). This 
manipulation was effective in producing significant 
differences in accuracy among groups. Changes in 
accuracy, however, were not accompanied by changes in 
confidence or by changes in the confidence-accuracy 
relation. 
In contrast to Deffenbacher's (1980) approach, 
other researchers interested in specifying moderators 
of the confidence-accuracy relationship have focused 
on the retrieval rather than the encoding stage of 
eyewitness memory. This perspective reflects what 
Wells (1978) has termed a system-variable approach to 
eyewitness research. Wells articulated the difference 
between what he termed system variables and estimator 
variables in eyewitness research. Estimator variables 
operate at the encoding stage of memory (e.g., viewing 
conditions) and are outside the control of the legal 
system. Although estimator variables can be 
controlled in research experiments, in actual cases 
their effects on eyewitness testimony can only be 
estimated. System variables, on the other hand, are 
post-witnessed-event variables (e.g., lineup 
identification instructions) that are under at least 
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some control by the legal system. They can be 
manipulated in actual cases to maximize the 
correspondence between eyewitness accuracy and 
confidence. 
One successful investigation of system variables 
that might moderate the accuracy-confidence 
relationship was conducted by Kassin (1985). In a 
series of four experiments, Kassin demonstrated that 
the accuracy-confidence relation could be improved by 
allowing witnesses to view videotapes of themselves 
making their identifications from a photospread before 
asking them to rate their confidence in their 
identifications. Kassin claimed that witnesses gained 
"retrospective self-awareness" (RSA) from this 
procedure. Kassin suggested two reasons for the 
success of RSA in improving the accuracy-confidence 
relation. First, it may have provided witnesses with 
an opportunity to make relevant inferences based on 
their overt behavior. Witnesses may, for example, 
have inferred that the quicker they made a decision, 
the more likely they were to be accurate. Second, RSA 
may have allowed witnesses to reexperience the 
thoughts they had when previously viewing the lineup 
and making an identification decision. 
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An Alternative Approach to the Accuracy-Certainty 
Question 
In contrast to previous investigations of the 
confidence-accuracy relation, the research reported 
here is based on the idea that one should not 
necessarily expect a relationship between eyewitness 
accuracy and confidence. The research was designed to 
explain the limited success of the search for 
moderators of the confidence-accuracy relation. The 
rationale for this approach is presented following a 
more general discussion of eyewitness confidence. 
What is Eyewitness Confidence? 
Researchers interested in eyewitness confidence 
have focused on the relationship between confidence 
and other variables and their implications in trial 
decisions. No research has yet articulated exactly 
what eyewitness confidence is beyond saying that it is 
a witness's belief in the accuracy of his or her 
testimony. 
Confidence in general is the intensity or 
strength with which a belief is held (Rokeach, 1968). 
In order to understand how this intensity of belief 
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varies, it is necessary to first consider the 
structure of beliefs. Intensity of belief often 
varies as a function of the structure of a belief. 
Rokeach (1968) distinguished between primitive and 
nonprimitive beliefs. Primitive beliefs "have an 
axiomatic, taken-for-granted character" (p. 6). They 
arise from direct contact with the belief object and 
are held as "basic truths" about oneself, others, and 
one's environment. Examples include: "oranges are 
round", and "sunlight is hot". These beliefs are 
fundamental to one's understanding of the world. To 
challenge them would be to challenge one's identity or 
basic understanding of the world. Rokeach provides a 
good example of the distress that can arise in re­
sponse to a challenge to a primitive belief. 
Specifically, Rokeach has observed that a young child 
initially enjoys it when a parent calls him or her by 
a different name, thinking it a new game. If the 
parent persists in the "game", however, the child 
becomes anxious, pleading with the parent to recognize 
who he or she actually is. 
A nonprimitive belief, on the other hand, is more 
heavily influenced by inferences or logical 
derivations. For example, a person might derive a 
9 
belief that a particular movie or restaurant is good 
based on an observation that many people are lined up 
to get into that movie or restaurant. Such 
nonprimitive beliefs might follow syllogism-like 
progressions (e.g., Jones & Gerard, 1967; McGuire, 
1969) or be more loosely tied to heuristic reasoning 
(e.g., Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). Although 
primitive beliefs might be associated with extremely 
high levels of certainty and be largely intractable, 
nonprimitive beliefs can be quite tractable as a 
function of new information. 
Is an eyewitness's identification, which is a 
statement that the identified person and the culprit 
are one and the same person, a primitive or 
nonprimitive belief? One view, seemingly implicit 
among those who are surprised about the poor relation 
between eyewitness identification confidence and 
eyewitness accuracy, is that such confidence is an 
expression of the degree to which the identified 
person resembles the eyewitness's memory for the 
culprit. In this sense, eyewitness identification 
confidence is a primitive belief in that it results 
from direct contact with the belief object. According 
to this view, in order to affect one's certainty of 
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identification there would have to be some mutation to 
the belief object (e.g., make the orange square rather 
than spherical or change the suspect's eyes from brown 
to blue) or an alteration to the witness's memory. 
The current research, however, assumes that 
eyewitness identification is a nonprimitive belief 
and, therefore, one's certainty of identification can 
be influenced by inferences that arise from factors 
other than direct experience with the belief object 
and other than the witness's memory. As a 
nonprimitive belief, eyewitness identification 
confidence should be highly malleable. In line with 
this assumption, eyewitness identification confidence 
is defined herein as the strength or intensity of a 
nonprimitive belief that the identified person and the 
culprit are one and the same person. 
Social Influence and Eyewitness Confidence 
One principle underlying the behavior of 
individuals under conditions of uncertainty is the 
principle of social proof (Cialdini, 1988). "This 
principle states that we determine what is correct by 
finding out what other people think is correct" 
(Cialdini, 1988, p. 110). The principle has been 
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generally applied to the way people decide what 
behavior is appropriate in a given situation. For 
example, in trying to decide what to wear to a social 
function, or whether to laugh at someone's comments or 
actions, people look to the behavior of others to 
decide what to do. This principle might be operating 
in eyewitness situations where witnesses are trying to 
evaluate the appropriateness of their lineup 
decisions. 
Eyewitnesses, when faced with the task of 
identifying the perpetrator from a lineup, may find 
themselves in a situation similar to that of 
participants in Sheriffs (1937) studies of norm 
formation. Sherif's participants stood together in 
pairs in a darkened room and observed the autokinetic 
phenomenon (the apparent movement of a stationary 
point of light in the dark). They were asked to 
estimate how far the light moved. The other 
participant was, in fact, a confederate who had been 
told to make estimations consistently lower or higher 
than those of the participant. Under these 
circumstances, the participant soon began to make 
estimates that were more and more similar to those of 
the confederate. 
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The situation in Sherif's (1937) study was one 
marked by uncertainty or ambiguity (participants had 
no guidelines or anchors on which to base their 
estimates). Under these conditions, participants were 
influenced by the confederate's estimates. Similarly, 
in eyewitness identification situations, eyewitnesses 
may be influenced by comments made by a police officer 
or co-eyewitnesses. Just as Sherif's participants 
came to distrust their estimates upon hearing a 
confederate state estimates that were widely 
discrepant from their own, so eyewitnesses might come 
to distrust their lineup choices upon learning that a 
co-eyewitness identified a different person. 
The general idea that co-eyewitnesses can 
influence an eyewitness's confidence is similar to the 
notion of social comparison. Social Comparison Theory 
(Festinger, 1954) proposes that people evaluate the 
appropriateness of their attitudes and opinions 
through comparisons with similar others under 
conditions of uncertainty. Such a comparison process 
might be operating in eyewitness situations wherein 
eyewitnesses are trying to evaluate the 
appropriateness of their lineup decisions. 
Social Comparison Theory proposes that we seek 
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out others in order to evaluate and find social 
support for our opinions (Festinger, 1954). Research 
suggests that such comparisons become particularly 
important in threatening or ambiguous situations 
(where there is no "objective reality"). Eyewitness 
identification situations contain this element of 
uncertainty. Because the police do not know for 
certain who the guilty party is, eyewitnesses can 
never be assured that they have correctly identified 
the perpetrator. So eyewitnesses might look to others 
who witnessed the same event for validation of their 
identification decisions. The goal of this research 
is to empirically test this idea. 
Upon learning that a co-eyewitness to the event 
identified the same lineup member, eyewitnesses might 
be expected to feel confident that they have correctly 
identified the perpetrator. This idea is consistent 
with the findings of Goethals and Nelson (1973). 
These researchers found that agreement from a similar 
other increases confidence in value judgments (i.e., 
judgments concerned with "what is affectively positive 
or negative" (p. 118) rather than what is verifiable). 
Eyewitness identification certainty can be considered 
a value judgment. As noted above, the accuracy of 
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eyewitness identifications cannot be verified by 
police officers or criminal justice officials. 
Witnesses can never be assured that they have made an 
accurate identification. They can learn that 
additional evidence either supports of contradicts 
their identification and can use this information to 
decide how they feel about their identifications. 
The present research was designed to explore the 
possibility that co-eyewitnesses to an event can serve 
as a source of social influence on eyewitness 
confidence. The research tests the hypothesis that 
eyewitness confidence can be raised or lowered by 
providing witnesses with information concerning the 
identification decision of a co-eyewitness to the 
event. 
Drawing on the conformity literature, such 
changes in confidence can be explained in terms of the 
motivations or needs of eyewitnesses, or people in 
general. People often conform because of two basic 
needs: the need to be liked and the need to be 
correct (Insko, 1985). Conformity based on this first 
need is known as normative social influence. Here, 
individuals are motivated to behave as others do in 
order to gain their approval and acceptance or at 
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least to avoid social rejection. So individuals might 
state that they agree with the opinions of their peer 
group in order to gain their approval while not 
necessarily accepting (i.e., believing) those views. 
This was the case in Asch's (1951) classic study of 
conformity. 
Asch asked participants to respond to a series of 
simple perceptual judgment tasks. These judgments 
involved deciding which of three comparison lines 
matched a standard line in length. Several 
confederates, posing as participants, took part in the 
judgment task as well. On pre-arranged trials, the 
confederates provided answers that were clearly 
inaccurate. The task was structured to ensure that 
the confederates always responded before the actual 
participant. Thus, participants were faced with the 
dilemma of either stating the correct answer and 
standing apart from the group or going along with the 
group by stating a judgment they knew was incorrect. 
The majority of Asch's participants succumbed to the 
group pressure implicit in the situation he had 
created: 76 percent of the particpants in his 
research went along with the group and publicly stated 
an incorrect response at least once. In the absence 
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Of any confederates only 5 percent of participants 
made incorrect judgments. 
Informational social influence, on the other 
hand, leads people to accept others' views, to 
internalize and believe those views as correct. Under 
conditions of uncertainty, people often look to others 
to help them understand what is correct. In deciding 
whether to interpret a situation as an emergency, for 
example, people often look to the reactions of others 
to decide whether they should offer assistance (Darley 
& Latane, 1968). 
In eyewitness identification situations, 
witnesses might consider the lineup decisions of co-
eyewitnesses in order to decide whether their decision 
was correct. This is a situation where witnesses 
might feel a need to know whether they have made the 
right decision. The eyewitness situation is not one 
marked by a need to be liked; hence normative social 
influence is unlikely to be the principal factor 
operating. Instead, it seems more likely that co-
witness information would operate through the 
principal of informational social influence. 
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The Basis of Eyewitness Confidence 
Extant research has shown that we should not 
necessarily expect a relationship between eyewitness 
accuracy and confidence. Eyewitness confidence can be 
altered by social forces subsequent to identification 
decisions (Wells, Lindsay, & Ferguson, 1981). 
Consistent with evidence presented by Nisbett and 
Wilson (1977), witnesses may well be unaware that some 
external factor has influenced their confidence. 
Nisbett and Wilson manipulated some component of 
various complex situations. The impact of the 
manipulations was assessed as were subjects' 
perceptions of their impact. Subjects' reports were 
commonly inaccurate. "If the stimulus component had a 
significant effect on responses, subjects typically 
reported that it was noninfluential" (p. 243). 
Leippe (1980) proposed that human information-
processing systems seem "capable of altering memory 
and confidence in orthogonal directions, especially in 
the context of powerful and rich social situations" 
(p. 271). Leippe suggested that eyewitness accuracy 
and confidence could be controlled by different 
mechanisms. That is, some factors could influence 
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accuracy while having no effect on confidence and 
other factors could influence confidence but not 
accuracy. Somewhat surprisingly, the role of social 
influence (the influence of other people) on 
eyewitnesses has been confined to research and theory 
on the malleability of eyewitness memory with no 
attempt to examine the role of social influence on 
eyewitness certainty. Furthermore, dominant 
theorizing about memory malleability has not adopted a 
social influence (e.g., conformity, compliance, 
persuasion) perspective, but rather has operated from 
a reconstructive memory or other purely cognitive 
framework (Loftus, 1974). Recently, a social 
influence perspective, involving concepts such as 
conformity, compliance, and source credibility, has 
been advocated in the memory malleability research 
literature (e.g., see McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1987), but 
the role of social influence in eyewitness certainty 
has remained conspicuously absent. 
Research and theory on the malleability of memory 
are especially relevant to the concept of confidence 
malleability for the following reason. Memory 
malleability research rests on a supposition that is 
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similar to the one that is tested in this research; 
namely, that other people serve as external sources of 
information and can influence one's testimony about a 
previously-witnessed event. 
The Malleability of Eyewitness Memory 
Loftus (1974) suggested that eyewitness accuracy 
might decrease as a function of post-witnessed-event 
cognitive processing. Subsequent to witnessing a 
crime, eyewitnesses might integrate their memories for 
the event with previously-stored memories, or they 
might modify or distort their recollection of what 
happened by combining that memory with information 
gained through discussion with others present at the 
scene of the crime. 
Research concerning the effects of misleading 
questions on eyewitness accuracy supports this memory 
report distortion hypothesis. Research indicates that 
providing witnesses with misleading postevent 
information — information that is inconsistent with 
some aspect of a witnessed event, can reduce the 
accuracy of eyewitness reports. In a number of 
studies (e.g., Loftus & Palmer, 1974; Loftus, 1975, 
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1977; Loftus, Miller, & Burns, 1978), participants who 
were provided with misleading postevent information 
tended to incorporate the information into their 
reports when questioned later about the event. In 
illustration, participants in Loftus' (1975) 
experiment viewed a slide sequence depicting a traffic 
accident. Following this they were asked to respond 
to questions about the event. One half of the 
participants were asked, "How fast was the white 
sports car going when it passed the barn while 
traveling along the country road?". This question was 
misleading in that the car did not pass a barn. 
Control condition participants were simply asked to 
estimate the speed of the car traveling along the 
country road. Only 2.7% of the control participants 
responded affirmatively when asked if they had seen 
barn. However, 17.3% of participants who received the 
misleading postevent information reported seeing a 
barn. Loftus interpreted these results as evidence 
that the misleading information impaired participants' 
memories of the event. 
The idea that misleading information impairs 
participants' memories for an event has recently been 
challenged by a number of researchers who argue that 
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misleading post event information may impair 
eyewitness reports but leave intact the eyewitnesses' 
memories (e.g., Bekerian & Bowers, 1983; McCloskey & 
Zaragoza, 1987; Smith & Ellsworth, 1987). McCloskey 
and Zaragoza, for example, had participants view a 
series of slides depicting a theft, then read a 
postnarrative that presented either neutral or 
misleading information about critical details, and 
finally respond to a test of their ability to recall 
the critical details. Virtually all previous 
postevent information research had assessed 
recognition rather than recall of some previously 
encountered information. McCloskey and Zaragoza found 
no difference between the memory performance of 
control and misled participants. 
Others have suggested that participants remember 
the original information but report misleading 
information in order to comply with experimental 
demand characteristics (McCloskey & Zaragoza, 1985a, 
1985b; Smith & Ellsworth, 1987; Turtle, 1984; 
Zaragoza, Jamis, & McCloskey, 1987). Smith and 
Ellsworth (1987) conducted a postevent information and 
memory study in which they manipulated perceived 
experimenter credibility. They found that those 
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participants who were questioned by a high-credibilty 
experimenter reported the misinformation but 
participants who were questioned by an experimenter 
who lacked credibility did not report the misleading 
information. Zaragoza, McCloskey, and Jamis (1987) 
found that when demand characteristics were eliminated 
from the experimental situation, the accuracy of 
misled participants' reports was comparable to that of 
control participants' reports. Response biases were 
eliminated by using test questions that excluded the 
misleading postevent information as a possible 
response. 
Regardless of whether memory for the event 
actually changes, the fact that witnesses report 
postevent information that is inconsistent with their 
original recollection is cause for concern. Jurors 
depend on eyewitnesses to provide them with an 
accurate description of witnessed events in order that 
they may render a correct verdict. These verdicts are 
heavily influenced by the certainty expressed by 
eyewitnesses. Indeed, confidence is the primary 
factor jurors use to judge the accuracy of witnesses' 
reports (Lindsay, Wells, & Rumpel, 1981; Wells, 
Lindsay, & Ferguson, 1979). The trustworthiness of 
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such verdicts then seems uncertain given jurors' 
reliance on eyewitness confidence to infer testimony 
accuracy and the weak relationship that has typically 
been found between eyewitness identification accuracy 
and confidence. 
The Malleability of Eyewitness Confidence 
Although unique in its focus on social influence 
and eyewitness confidence, the present research is not 
the first investigation of the social bases of 
eyewitness confidence. There is already some 
empirical support for the idea that eyewitness 
identification confidence can be altered independently 
of identification accuracy (Wells, Lindsay, & 
Ferguson, 1981). 
Leippe (1980) proposed that merely thinking about 
a witnessed event might bolster eyewitness confidence. 
Leippe drew this conclusion from Tesser's (1978) 
research that found that people's attitudes toward 
stimuli such as artwork tended to polarize with post-
exposure-thought about the stimulus. Wells et al. 
(1981) tested this proposition by staging thefts for 
unsuspecting participants who later attempted to 
identify the thief from a set of photographs. 
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Subject-witnesses who identified a member of the 
photospread were cross-examined. Prior to being cross 
examined, half of all subject-witnesses were briefed 
about the types of questions they could expect under 
cross examination and were encouraged to rehearse 
possible answers to these question. The cross 
examinations were then videotaped and later shown to 
mock jurors for evaluation. The briefings were 
expected to increase witnesses' thinking about the 
witnessed event and, thus, bolster eyewitness 
confidence. Elevated confidence was expected to 
enhance perceived eyewitness credibility. 
The results indicated that witnesses who had been 
briefed expressed more confidence in their suspect 
identifications than did those who were not briefed. 
The elevated confidence associated with the briefing 
manipulation was primarily attributable to increased 
certainty on the part of eyewitnesses who 
misidentified the perpetrator. The briefing 
manipulation produced statistically significant 
increases in expressed confidence for inaccurate but 
not accurate eyewitness identifications. The briefing 
manipulation thereby eliminated jurors' abilities to 
distinguish accurate from inaccurate eyewitnesses. 
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Subject-jurors were also significantly more likely to 
vote to convict the accused if he had been identified 
by eyewitnesses who had been briefed rather than an 
eyewitness who had not been briefed. 
The practice of briefing witnesses before they 
take the stand is a common courtroom practice. This 
practice augments the difficulty of the task faced by 
jurors of distinguishing accurate from inaccurate 
eyewitness accounts. Unfortunately, the practice of 
briefing eyewitnesses is probably not the only source 
of inflated eyewitness confidence. In fact, "police 
officers and lawyers probably engage in numerous 
behaviors that promote a commitment-confidence spiral" 
(Leippe, 1980, p. 272). 
Law enforcement officials do not provide the only 
external influences on eyewitness confidence. In 
actual criminal cases, there are numerous events that 
might occur after an eyewitness makes an 
identification, but before giving testimony, that 
could affect the certainty with which that 
identification testimony is delivered. If we are to 
understand the processes giving rise to the certainty 
with which eyewitness identification testimony is 
delivered, we must study the events that can occur 
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between identification and the time of testimony that 
could inflate or deflate eyewitness certainty. 
The present research concerns the possible 
effects of the eyewitness's knowledge of the decisions 
made by a co-eyewitness. It is not uncommon for there 
to be more than one eyewitness to a criminal event. 
Although modern eyewitness procedural guidelines 
firmly recommend that eyewitnesses be separated prior 
to and during lineup identification tasks (Wells, 
1988), there are no prohibitions against these 
witnesses discussing their identification decisions 
after the identification task. In the present 
experiment, information regarding the identification 
decision of the co-witness was communicated by the 
experimenter rather than by the co-witness so that the 
nature of that information could be controlled and 
randomized in an experimental design. But the 
experimenter is merely a medium of the social 
information; the ostensible decision of the co-witness 
is the agent of social influence. 
Although the term feedback is used here to 
describe the delivery of information regarding the 
decision of the co-witness, it is not meant to imply 
that the witness is receiving information about the 
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accuracy of Identification. Positive feedback, for 
example, simply means that the witness is told that 
the co-witness identified the same person that she or 
he identified and negative feedback means that the co-
- witness made a different identification decision. It 
is up to the witness to make inferences about such 
feedback. Nevertheless, Social Comparison Theory 
(Festinger, 1954) and common logic predict that 
positive feedback should inflate confidence and 
negative feedback should generally deflate confidence. 
As will become apparent later, however, some forms of 
negative feedback are not expected to have confidence-
deflating effects. 
This research is only the second empirical 
assessment of the malleability of eyewitness 
confidence and its implications for triers-of-fact. 
It differs from the first confidence-malleability 
study in three important ways. First, whereas the 
first confidence-malleability study (Wells et al., 
1981) demonstrated that eyewitness confidence can be 
raised by extramemorial factors, the present research 
investigates the possibility that eyewitness 
confidence can be both raised and lowered by positive 
or negative influences. Second, the present research 
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is the first to explore a social (i.e., interpersonal) 
influence factor. Third this research is the first 
investigation of the process underlying changes in 
eyewitness confidence. 
The Process Underlying Changes in Confidence 
Within the context of this research there are two 
possible reasons for any changes in eyewitness 
confidence resulting from the feedback manipulation. 
First, witnesses might come to express more or less 
confidence about their identifications as a function 
of social support. That is, changes in eyewitness 
confidence might reflect changes in eyewitness' 
comfort with their lineup decisions upon learning that 
a co-eyewitness either agreed or disagreed with their 
choice from the lineup. 
According to this process, which could be called 
an "ally" effect, the mere presence of someone who 
agrees (or disagrees) gives witnesses the confidence 
(or not) to firmly stand behind their identification 
decisions. The social support or ally hypothesis does 
not suppose that the witness internalizes the 
information. Instead, the ally effect hypothesis 
assumes that the process is one of normative social 
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influence (Insko, 1985). That is, agreement by the 
co-witness gives comfort to the witnesses that they 
are not alone in their decisions and disagreements by 
the co-witness produces a discomfort at standing alone 
or somehow being different. 
Alternatively, changes in eyewitness confidence 
might reflect changes in the eyewitnesses' cognitions. 
That is, learning that a co-eyewitness either agrees 
or disagrees with one's lineup decision might do more 
than simply affect one's sense of being supported 
versus alone in their decision. Such information 
might serve to actually change eyewitnesses' beliefs 
about their memories or activate certain thoughts or 
attributions. 
As noted previously, the information concerning a 
co-eyewitness's identification decision is a potential 
source of informational social influence that produces 
an internalization of the belief that one is correct 
or incorrect. For example, eyewitnesses who learn 
that their identification is corroborated might start 
thinking about how well they remember or trust their 
memory for the witnessed event (e.g., "I must have had 
a really good view of the thief".) 
This idea is consistent with the process of self-
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perception (Bern, 1972). Self-perception theory 
maintains that beliefs or emotions can be created by 
perceptions of one's own behavior. From a self-
perception perspective, eyewitness confidence can 
develop from knowledge of a co-eyewitness's 
identification decision. Eyewitnesses should report a 
strong sense of certainty after making their 
identifications upon learning that a co-eyewitness 
agreed with their choice. This information allows 
them to note that their behavior was consistent with 
that of a person faced with the same task. They may 
well reflect on their behavior and think, "I must have 
had a good memory for what happened and thus 
identified the right person since the other witness 
made the same choice". These eyewitnesses might also 
recall previous occasions when they were able to 
vividly recall some event or when they performed well 
on a recall test. As a result of such thoughts coming 
to mind, eyewitnesses' faith in the accuracy of their 
memories might come to exist indenendentlv of the 
feedback information. If such independence occurs, 
then it might be possible to discredit the feedback 
information and yet find perseverance of its effects. 
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Belief Perseverance and Eyewitness Confidence 
Belief perseverance is a phenomenon whereby 
people tend to hold tightly to their beliefs even in 
the face of contradictory evidence. Ross, Lepper, and 
Hubbard (1975), for example, demonstrated that self-
perceptions may persevere after the initial basis for 
such perceptions has been discredited. These 
researchers first provided participants with false 
feedback suggesting that they had either succeeded or 
failed on a novel discrimination task. Participants 
were later told that the feedback they received had 
been randomly determined prior to their arrival at the 
laboratory. Nevertheless, participants persevered in 
their belief in the feedback they had received, still 
thinking themselves skilled at the task if previously 
told that they had succeeded and unskilled if 
previously told that they had failed. Ross et al. 
explained their results in terms of the feedback 
generating a biased attribution process through which 
subsequently-considered information is processed. 
Participants who received success feedback may 
well have recalled previous successes on problem-
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solving tasks or experiences congruent with their 
feeling of being skilled at the task. Similarly, the 
"failure feedback" may well have aroused memories of 
experiences congruent with their feeling of 
incompetence at the task. The feedback caused 
participants to think of experiences that were not 
only consistent with their alleged performances on the 
task but that also served to explain their 
performances. Thus, participants recalled or 
postulated additional evidence that their performances 
were, in fact, indicative of their ability. This 
additional evidence could have helped to sustain their 
beliefs even after the debriefing. 
In the case of the present research, the feedback 
manipulation might activate certain thoughts. 
Confirmatory feedback might cause eyewitnesses to 
think about how well they remember or trust their 
memories for a witnessed event. Disconfirmatory 
feedback might be expected to have the opposite 
effect, arousing thoughts of distrust in their 
memories for the event. So, eyewitnesses' faith in 
the accuracy of their memories might well come to 
exist independently of the information that created 
their feeling of confidence (i.e., independently of 
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the confidence-distorting information). Thus, if the 
information was later disconfirmed (i.e., if witnesses 
later learned that they had been misinformed about a 
co-eyewitness's lineup decision), witnesses would 
still maintain the sense of confidence in their 
memories they had derived from this information. The 
research reported here includes an information-
discrediting manipulation to test this possibility. 
This research tested the following hypotheses: 
(a) eyewitnesses' confidence would increase as a 
function of learning that a co-witness identified the 
same person they did, (b) eyewitnesses' confidence 
would decrease as a function of learning that a co-
witnesses identified someone other than they did, (c) 
learning that a co-witness rejected the lineup would 
decrease eyewitnesses' identification certainty 
relative to no information, (d) witnesses would 
persevere in the feelings of certainty induced by the 
co-witness information even the information was 
subsequently revised or discredited. 
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EXPERIMENT ONE 
Overview 
The experimental paradigm was modeled upon a two-
experiment procedure developed by Wells (e.g., 
Lindsay, Wells, & Rumpel, 1981; Wells, Lindsay, & 
Ferguson, 1979). In the first experiment, university 
students witnessed a staged theft. After witnessing 
the crime, these students were asked to identify the 
thief from a 6-person, target-absent photospread. 
Note that this research was concerned only with 
eyewitness confidence, not eyewitness accuracy. Thus, 
soliciting identifications from only a target-absent 
lineup (for which all identifications are incorrect) 
simplified the design/implementation of the first 
experiment and yielded a sample of witnesses whose 
identification confidence could be manipulated. The 
experimenter then provided witnesses with information 
concerning the lineup decision of another participant 
who witnessed the event at the same time. 
The experimenter provided either no information 
concerning a co-eyewitness's identification decision 
or information suggesting that a co-eyewitness either 
agreed or disagreed with their identification 
decision. In some cases the information was 
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subsequently revised. 
Following the feedback manipulation, witnesses 
responded to a series of questions about the theft (by 
someone who was blind to condition) while they were 
being videotaped. This interview included a question 
concerning how confident witnesses felt about their 
identification decisions. This measure of confidence 
was the primary dependent measure. Ancillary measures 
included (l) the number of details witnesses provided 
in describing the thief, and (2) witnesses' estimates 
of how long the thief was in view. These ancillary 
measures were included to assess changes in the 
witnesses' cognitions as a function of the co-witness 
information. If the information changed witnesses' 
beliefs about their memories, their testimonies might 
also change. If, for example, witnesses were induced 
to feel that they had a particularly vivid memory of 
the event, they might provide more detailed 
descriptions of the culprit and longer estimates of 
the time she was in view. 
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Method 
Subjects and design 
One hundred and forty male and female 
undergraduate psychology students were randomly 
assigned to the 9 conditions of the experiment (see 
Table 1}. In the first condition, witnesses received 
no information concerning a co-eyewitness's 
identification decision (no information or control 
condition). In the second condition, witnesses were 
told that a co-eyewitness made the same identification 
(same condition). Witnesses in the third condition 
were told that the co-eyewitness identified a 
different person who looked similar to the witness's 
choice fdifferent condition). Witnesses in the fourth 
condition were told that the co-eyewitness identified 
a different person who looked highly dissimilar to the 
witness's choice fimplausibly different condition). In 
the fifth condition, witnesses were told that a co-
eyewitness rejected the photospread because he/she 
felt the thief was not there (not there condition). 
In the sixth condition witnesses were initially told 
that a co-eyewitness identified a different person but 
subsequently notified that the co-eyewitness, in fact. 
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Identified the same person they did (different/same 
condition). Witnesses in the seventh condition were 
initially told that a co-eyewitness identified the 
same person but subsequently notified that the co-
eyewitness, in fact, identified a different person 
(same/different condition). Witnesses in the eighth 
condition were initially told that a co-eyewitness 
identified the same person but subsequently notified 
that the experimenter was not sure who the co-
eyewitness identified (same/withdraw condition). In 
the ninth condition, witnesses were first told that a 
co-eyewitness identified a different person but were 
subsequently notified that the experimenter was not 
sure who the co-eyewitness identified 
fdifferent/withdraw condition). 
Procedure 
Participants were tested in same-sex pairs. Upon 
arrival at the laboratory, the experimenter explained 
that the study was concerned with people's ability to 
match voices to faces. Participants were told that 
they would be asked to view a set of photographs while 
listening to a tape-recording with the goal of trying 
to match a photograph to each voice they heard on the 
tape. The experimenter then explained that the 
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photographs and taped interviews were provided by 
previous participants in the current experiment. She 
further explained that the task should be somewhat 
difficult because the tape would be played on a "voice 
modulator player", allegedly a piece of recording 
equipment that can create distortions in recorded 
voices, producing variations in pitch and intonation. 
This information was provided to enhance the 
believability of the ostensible theft of the 
equipment. Given the supposed value of this 
equipment, it would seem understandable that someone 
would steal it. The experimenter would understandably 
be distressed at its loss given the expense involved 
in replacing it. Participants were told that they 
would be given an opportunity to be photographed and 
taped while describing some of their life experiences 
after completing the photo-matching task. The 
experimenter explained that the recording equipment 
was set up in a room down the hall. She instructed 
participants to proceed to this room, explaining that 
she would be along shortly. 
A confederate awaited them in this second room. 
Upon entering the room, the confederate glanced 
nervously in their direction then grabbed a large 
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piece of equipment and hurried from the room. Ten 
seconds later the experimenter entered the room 
carrying a cassette tape. She looked toward an empty 
table and turned a surprised gaze toward the two 
participants. She then began looking around the room 
in search of the recording equipment she had 
apparently expected to see on the empty table. At 
this point, many participants volunteered that they 
had seen someone leave the room with some equipment 
just before the experimenter arrived. If neither of 
the participants volunteered this information, the 
experimenter told them that she couldn't find the 
"voice modulator player". In every case, given this 
prompt, one of the participants told the experimenter 
about the confederate's hurried exit from the room. 
In response to this news, the experimenter asked the 
participants to wait while she searched the corridor 
for the person who took the equipment. 
The experimenter then exited the room, waited 
outside the door for 20 seconds, then reentered and 
worriedly remarked that she was unable to find the 
young woman and must now notify the department chair 
about the missing equipment. She then lifted the 
receiver from a disconnected telephone and pretended 
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to talk to the chair about the missing equipment, 
noting aloud that there were two witnesses to the 
theft. She "listened" to the chair reply that he 
would notify campus security and instruct them to send 
someone over immediately to talk to the two witnesses. 
In order to keep the participants aware of what was 
developing, the experimenter acknowledged what the 
chair was allegedly saying by restating/confirming his 
ostensible end of the conversation in a voice loud 
enough for the participants to "overhear" her. The 
experimenter continued to "listen" to the chair 
explain that she should compile a list of all 
participants in the current experiment to give to the 
security officer to assist their investigation by 
informing them of people familiar with the laboratory 
and the equipment stored there. 
The experimenter stated that she would put the 
list together right away. She noted that she also had 
photographs of everyone who had participated in the 
study which she could include with the list of names. 
Again, she "listened" to the department chair instruct 
her to show the photographs to the two witnesses on 
the chance that the thief was a participant in the 
study. The experimenter agreed and added that "it 
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must have been one of the participants in this study 
— after all the only people who know anything about 
my missing equipment are people who have taken part in 
this study". The experimenter then replaced the 
receiver, turned to the participants and, without 
acknowledging their having overheard her talking on 
the phone, recounted her "conversation" with the 
department chair. She explained that the thief must 
have been a previous participant because the only 
people who knew about the stolen equipment were the 
experimenter herself and people who had taken part in 
the study. She reminded participants that she had 
photographs of every person who had taken part in the 
experiment and explained that she would show them 
these photos while they waited for campus security to 
arrive. 
The experimenter explained that her file of 
photographs of participants in the current experiment 
was in another room. She asked if one person would 
accompany her to sort through the photographs while 
the second person remained in the room in order to 
answer the phone if the department chair or campus 
security should call. The experimenter and one 
participant exited the room, walked down the hallway. 
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then entered a second room where the photographs were 
allegedly stored. The experimenter rifled through a 
file cabinet in this room, then commented that she 
must have left the photographs in her office. She 
asked the participant to remain in the room while she 
retrieved the photographs from her office, then 
exited. 
The experimenter returned to each witness in turn 
with a set of six photographs of "previous 
participants", explaining that only six women had 
previously participated in the experiment. The 
experimenter always claimed that she had already shown 
the photographs to the other participant. The effect 
of this was to lead each participant to believe that 
he/she was the second of the two witnesses to view the 
set of photographs. Witnesses were asked to identify 
the woman they had seen take the equipment from the 
room. In the hope of securing a high rate of false 
identifications, the experimenter implied that the 
thief must be present in the set of photographs and 
instructed witnesses to indicate "which of these women 
did it?". After recording the witness's decision, the 
experimenter provided him/her with one of nine types 
of information concerning the alleged identification 
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of the co-eyewitness to the event (see Table 1). 
The nine types of information included: (1) no 
information about a co-eyewitness's decision, (2) an 
acknowledgment that a co-eyewitness "also identified 
her", (3) a statement that a co-eyewitness "said she 
wasn't one of these people", (4) an assertion that a 
co-eyewitness identified a different person (in this 
condition, the experimenter pointed to a photo of a 
woman who looked similar to the person the participant 
identified, i.e., a photo of a woman with the same 
hair and eye color, hair length, height, and build), 
(5) an assertion that a co-eyewitness identified an 
implausibly-different person (with this statement, the 
experimenter pointed to a photo of a woman who looked 
dissimilar to the participant's choice, i.e., a taller 
woman with a larger build and longer hair of a 
different color and texture). 
The following four types of information were 
included in order to determine whether witnesses would 
persevere in their feelings of confidence concerning 
their identifications if they subsequently learned 
that they had been misinformed about a co-eyewitness's 
identification decision. These latter four conditions 
conveyed the following information: (6) The 
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experimenter first told the witness that a co-
eyewitness "identified this woman" while indicating a 
photograph of a woman who looked similar to their 
choice. Two minutes later the experimenter explained 
that she "had the photos in a different order when she 
showed them to the other person". She corrected the 
original information, stating that "the other person, 
in fact, identified the same person that you did", (7) 
Two minutes after learning that a co-eyewitness had 
identified the same person, the experimenter explained 
that she "had the photos in a different order when she 
showed them to the other witness" and so was "not sure 
who the other person identified", (8) The witness was 
first told that a co-eyewitness had identified the 
same person. The experimenter two minutes later 
withdrew this information, stating that she "had the 
photos in a different order when showed them to the 
other witness " and so was "not sure who the other 
person identified", (9) The experimenter first told 
the witness that a co-eyewitness "identified this 
woman" while indicating a photo of a woman who looked 
similar to their choice. Two minutes later the 
experimenter corrected this information, stating that 
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TABLE 1 
Experiment 1 — Design 
1. NO INFORMATION 
witness receives no information regarding the 
identification of their co-witness 
2. SAME IDENTIFICATION 
witness is told that co-witness IDed the same person 
3. NOT THERE 
witness is told that their co-witness rejected the 
photospread because he/she did not believe the 
suspect was present 
4. DIFFERENT IDENTIFICATION 
witness is told that their co-witness identified a 
different person (a person who looks similar to 
the one he/she identifid) 
5. IMPLAUSIBLY-DIFFERENT IDENTIFICATION 
witness is told that their co-witness IDed a different 
person (one who looks dissimilar to their choice) 
6. DIFFERENT/SAME 
witness is told that their co-witness identified a 
different person (a person who looks similar to 
the one he/she identified) 
the experimenter later corrects that information, 
stating that the other witness, in fact, 
identified the same person 
7. SAME/DIFFERENT 
witness is told that co-witness IDed the same person 
the experimenter later corrects that information, 
stating that the co-witness, in fact, identified a 
different person (a person who looks similar to 
the one he/she identified) 
8. SAME/WITHDRAW 
witness is told that co-witness IDed the same person 
the experimenter later withdraws that information, 
stating that she is not sure who the co-witness IDed 
9. DIFFERENT/WITHDRAW 
witness is told that co-witness IDed a different person 
this information is later withdrawn 
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'•the other witness, in fact, identified the same 
person you did". 
Approximately 10 minutes after the experimenter 
placed the phone call to the department chair, a 
confederate, wearing a campus security uniform 
arrived. The "security officer" explained that she 
would like to question each witness individually about 
the theft. The officer continued to explain that it 
is now standard procedure to videotape all interviews 
in order to obtain a clear record of eyewitnesses' 
reports. Participants were asked to consent to being 
videotaped while responding to the officer's 
questions. All witnesses agreed. 
The officer asked witnesses a series of questions 
concerning their memories of the theft (see Appendix 
A). The final question in this interview was a query 
concerning how confident witnesses felt about their 
identifications. The officer asked witnesses to 
quantify this response by providing a confidence 
estimate ranging from 1 to 10, where 1 was "not at all 
confident" and 10 was "very confident". At the 
conclusion of the interviews, participants were 
thanked for their participation and fully debriefed.^ 
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Results 
Only 4 of the 140 witnesses did not make an 
identification. The analyses are based on the 
responses of witnesses who made an identification from 
the set of photographs. 
Self-rated confidence 
A one-way analysis of variance on self-rated 
confidence yielded a significant between-groups effect 
2(8, 134) = 20.05, £<.0001. The mean confidence 
ratings in the nine information conditions (see Table 
1) were 6.90, 8.77, 3.57, 4.67, 7.87, 4.60, 8.33, 
8,53, 6.13, respectively. 
Subsequent Newman Keuls analyses indicated that, 
with one exception, every type of information produced 
a significant departure from providing participants 
with no information (see Figure 1). Informing 
witnesses that a co-eyewitness identified either the 
same person or a different person who looked 
dissimilar to their choice had the effect of inflating 
eyewitness confidence beyond no information. 
Reporting that a co-eyewitness either rejected the 
photospread or identified a different person who 
looked similar to their choice produced a decrease in 
eyewitnesses' confidence relative to no information. 
Figure Caption 
Figure 1 Self-rated confidence as a function of 
identification feedback (Note: Means not sharing a 
common letter differ at E<.05) 
no same not diff im— diff/same^ame/diff/ 
info ID there ID plaus same diff with with 
INFORMATION 
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The Newman Keuls analyses also indicate that 
witnesses generally persevered in the level of 
confidence that was induced by the original 
information rather than acquiring a level of 
confidence implied by the later "corrected" 
information. Consider, for example, the fact that the 
ID Same and ID Same/Different condition means 
did not differ significantly (means = 8.77 and 8.33, 
respectively), but both were significantly higher than 
the control (no information) condition (mean = 6.9). 
The ID Same and ID Same/Withdraw condition also 
yielded the same level of confidence as the ID Same 
condition (mean = 8.53) and was significantly higher 
than the control condition. 
Perseverance effects were also apparent in the ID 
Different/ID Same condition (mean = 4.60) as the mean 
did not differ from the ID Different condition 
(mean = 4.67) whereas both means were significantly 
lower than the control condition mean. An exception 
to the perseverance pattern was found in the ID 
Different/Withdraw condition where the mean 
confidence in that condition (mean = 6.13) was 
significantly higher than the ID Different 
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condition and not significantly higher from the control 
condition mean. 
Descriptions of the thief 
A one-way analysis of variance on the number of 
details witnesses provided in their descriptions of 
the thief yielded a significant between-groups effect 
F (8, 126) = 6.22, ^ <«0001. Subsequent Newman Keuls 
analyses Indicated that eyewitnesses in the ID Same 
and ID Implausibly Different Other conditions provided 
more details when asked to describe the thief than did 
witnesses in the control (no information) condition. 
These were the only conditions in which the mean 
number of details provided differed from the control 
condition. The Same/Withdraw condition (mean = 7.80) 
did not differ from the ID Same and ID Implausibly 
Different Other conditions (means = 8.60 and 9.60, 
respectively) in terms of number of details provided. 
Time estimates 
Witnesses were asked to estimate the length of 
time the suspect was in view. A one-way analysis of 
variance on this measure failed to reveal a 
significant effect for co-witness Information (e>.60). 
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Discussion 
Experiment 1 tested the hypothesis that 
eyewitness confidence can be both raised and lowered 
by external sources. The results support this 
hypothesis. Eyewitness confidence was shown to be 
malleable in response to information concerning a co-
eyewitness's identification decision. 
Eyewitnesses who were told that a co-eyewitness 
identified the same person they did were more 
confident than witnesses who were told nothing about a 
co-eyewitness. After choosing someone from the 
photospread, eyewitnesses likely wanted to feel that 
they had made the "right choice", i.e., identified the 
culprit. Learning that another witness identified the 
same person might have helped. Just as we often 
"determine what is correct by finding out what others 
think is correct" (Cialdini, 1988, p. 110) so 
eyewitnesses in this study might have determined 
whether their identification decision was correct by 
finding out what other witnesses decided. Consistent 
with this idea, eyewitnesses who learned that a co-
eyewitness disagreed with their choice and identified 
someone else — a person who looked similar to their 
choice — reported lower confidence ratings than 
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witnesses given no information. 
The situation was different when witnesses were 
led to believe that a co-eyewitness had identified an 
implausibly different other. In this condition, 
eyewitness confidence was enhanced beyond no 
information. It was anticipated that witnesses would 
tend to treat the implausibly-different identification 
feedback similarly to no information. Why might 
witnesses have come to feel more confident upon 
learning that a co-eyewitness identified a different 
person who looked dissimilar to their choice? 
This surprising result might be attributable to a 
"conservatism" or "anticipated regret" process going 
on in the control (no information) condition. In the 
control condition, witnesses might have given a 
conservative estimate of their confidence out of fear 
that they would regret appearing confident if the 
other witness had chosen the viable alternative. In 
the condition where witnesses learn that the co-
witness identified an implausible person, on the other 
hand, witnesses are relieved of this possibility. 
This interpretation would be testable by having a 
condition in which there was no co-witness. If there 
was conservatism in the control condition owing to 
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uncertainty about what the other witness had done, a 
no co-witness condition should produce a higher mean 
level of confidence than the control condition. 
There are alternative explanations for the fact 
that a co-witness's identification of an implausible 
alternative served to actually enhance. rather than 
merely nullify a decrease in confidence. One requires 
a comparison of the implausiblv-different other 
condition with the different condition. In neither 
condition, did witnesses make their decisions quickly. 
Instead, they carefully considered two or three photos 
of similar-looking women before making their 
decisions. Learning that a co-eyewitness allegedly 
identified a different person who looked similar to 
their choice might have reminded witnesses of the 
difficulty they had had in choosing between the photo 
they selected and the one chosen by the co-eyewitness. 
Such memories would not have been stirred by informing 
witnesses that a co-eyewitness identified a 
dissimilar-looking other. Rather, such information 
would more likely have caused witnesses to doubt the 
credibility of the co-eyewitness rather than the 
accuracy of their identification. The co-eyewitness 
identified someone who was not even seriously 
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considered by the witness because she looked so 
dissimilar to their memories of the thief (i.e., they 
remembered a woman with blonde hair and the co-
eyewitness identified a brunette). Eyewitnesses here 
did more than simply dismiss this witness's 
identification. Their confidence improved beyond that 
of witnesses given no information. 
This fits with a finding from the illusion of 
control literature. Some of the research in this area 
has focused on gambling or games of chance situations. 
Eyewitness identification situations share the element 
of uncertainty characteristic of these situations. 
Just as players in a game of chance can never be 
certain that they have chosen the winning outcome, so 
eyewitnesses can never be certain that they have 
identified the culprit from a lineup. In both 
situations, there is no one who can confirm that the 
gambler or the eyewitness has made the "right choice". 
In gambling and eyewitness identification 
situations, only one choice will "pay off" with a 
prize or lawful conviction, respectively. If game 
players discover that they have placed a different bet 
than another player they must realize that they are 
not both going to win. Similarly, if eyewitnesses 
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discover that a co-eyewitness identified someone else, 
they must realize that they cannot both be accurate. 
In both situations information concerning an 
opponent's bet or a co-eyewitness's identification 
might be expected to influence one's confidence in 
having made a "good choice". Langer (1977) has 
demonstrated that people feel more confident about the 
likelihood of winning a game of chance against a 
novice nervous gambler than against an experienced 
confident opponent. Similarly, witnesses in the 
current study might have felt more confident upon 
learning that a co-eyewitness of questionable 
credibility effectively placed a different bet in 
disagreeing with their lineup choice. 
There was another condition in this study in 
which eyewitness confidence decreased when witnesses 
were told that a co-eyewitness disagreed with their 
lineup decision. In this condition, witnesses were 
told that a co-eyewitness did not make an 
identification because he or she did not believe the 
culprit was present in the set of photos. This 
feedback reduced eyewitness confidence relative to no 
information. In fact, relative to the control 
condition, the "not there" condition had more impact 
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on witnesses' confidence than any other condition. 
Why would the "not there" condition have such a 
strong impact? It has been argued that eyewitnesses 
approach identification tasks with an implicit 
assumption that the target in question is present 
among the alternatives (Wells, 1984). As a result, 
target-absent lineups like the one used in the current 
study, tend to produce high false identification rates 
(see Lindsay & Wells, 1980), especially when witnesses 
are not forewarned that the culprit might not be 
present (Malpass & Devine, 1981a). In addition, a 
none-of-the-above type response was, in fact, the 
correct answer for witnesses to make in response to 
the identification task. It is perhaps not surprising 
that the condition that had the greatest impact on 
witnesses' confidence levels was the one in which 
witnesses were told that the co-witness said the thief 
was not among the pictures. Not only did witnesses 
possibly realize that this was something they failed 
to consider, but they might have also realized that 
the none-of-the-above response was probably the 
correct answer. In fact, four of the fifteen 
witnesses in this condition actually retracted their 
identifications when later questioned by the security 
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officer, the only condition in which retractions 
occurred. 
Were the effects of co-witness information on 
confidence derived from social support (e.g., an 
"ally" effect) or were these effects due to the 
informational value of the co-eyewitness's behavior 
and thereby internalized? The results suggest that 
the changes in confidence observed in the current 
study were due to something more than social support 
from a co-eyewitness. An analysis of the testimonies 
across conditions indicates that the increases in 
eyewitness confidence that were observed when 
witnesses were told either that a co-eyewitness 
identified the same person or an implausibly different 
other were accompanied by qualitative differences in 
testimony. Witnesses in these two conditions provided 
more detailed descriptions of the thief than did 
witnesses given no information about a co-eyewitness. 
Yet, the viewing conditions were held constant across 
conditions. This suggests that the feedback in these 
two conditions not only altered witnesses' confidence 
about their identifications but also changed their 
recollections of the witnessed event. Witnesses in 
the Same ID and Implausibly-Different ID conditions 
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came to believe that they had a better memory for the 
thief than did witnesses in the No Information 
condition and thus provided more detailed 
descriptions. On the other hand, it is possible that 
a feeling of social support simply made these subjects 
more willing to offer a detailed rather than sketchy 
description. 
Perhaps the strongest evidence against the notion 
that these effects derive from mere social support is 
the fact that the "Implausibly-Different ID" condition 
produced inflated confidence rather than deflated 
confidence. Were it the case that confidence 
increased and decreased merely because there was or 
was not an ally for the witness, confidence should 
have been deflated by news that a co-witness 
identified someone else. A social support explanation 
would predict similar confidence-deflating effects for 
co-witness identifications of similar and dissimilar 
others. 
Were it simply a matter of social support, 
witnesses who were subsequently told that the original 
feedback they had received was incorrect should have 
adjusted their reported confidence to be consistent 
with the degree of social support associated with the 
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updated information. For example, witnesses who felt 
comfortable stating high confidence merely because a 
co-eyewitness agreed with their choice should have 
lost this feeling upon losing the social support of 
this witness, i.e., upon learning that they had been 
misinformed, that the co-eyewitness actually 
identified someone else. This did not happen. 
Eyewitnesses whose confidence was either raised or 
lowered by information concerning the alleged 
identification decision of a co-eyewitness generally 
persevered in those levels of confidence. Their 
confidence ratings did not increase or decrease as a 
function of their learning subsequently that they had 
either gained or lost the social support of a co-
eyewitness. Hence, it appears that the effect was 
internalized at some level that exceeded mere social 
support. 
There was one exception to this perseverance 
finding. Specifically, perseverance was not observed 
among witnesses for whom the original information 
stating that the co-witness identified a different 
person was withdrawn (experimenter claimed that she 
"was not sure who the other person identified"). In 
this case, eyewitnesses reported feeling as confident 
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as witnesses given no information about a co-
eyewitness. There is no simple explanation for this 
finding. It cannot be explained by a tendency among 
witnesses to, in the absence of any contrary evidence, 
believe they had made accurate identifications. If 
this were the case, witnesses whose confidence was 
reduced by learning that a co-eyewitness identified a 
"similar other" should have rebounded from that low 
level of confidence upon learning that the co-
eyewitness had actually agreed with their choice. 
Yet, this did not happen. Witnesses in this 
"corrected information" condition were no more 
confident than witnesses who received only the 
confidence-deflating news that a co-eyewitness 
identified a "similar other". 
Why then did eyewitness confidence rise when the 
experimenter updated the confidence-deflating news, 
stating that she "was not sure who the other person 
identified" but remain low when the updated 
information assured witnesses that "the other person 
actually identified the same woman you did"? Perhaps 
witnesses in this latter condition did not believe the 
updated information for the following reason. Perhaps 
they questioned the sincerity of the experimenter when 
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she updated the confidence-deflating news. Witnesses 
might have felt that the experimenter revised the 
information only to help them feel better or recover 
some of their confidence in their memories for the 
event. Again, however, this fails to explain why 
witnesses persevered in the other condition where the 
co-witness information was subsequently withdrawn 
("same/withdraw" condition). Therefore, at this 
point, there is no clear explanation for the apparent 
lack of perseverance in the "different/withdraw" 
condition. 
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EXPERIMENT TWO 
The purpose of Experiment 2 was to examine the 
effects of the different types of Information 
concerning a co-eyewltness's Identification decision 
on jurors' perceptions of eyewitness credibility. 
Experiment 1 demonstrated that eyewitness confidence 
can be both raised and lowered by providing witnesses 
with Information concerning the Identification 
decision of a co-eyewltness. Experiment 2 was 
designed to assess what Implications these changes In 
confidence would have for jurors' evaluations of the 
witnesses' testimonies. Would the feedback 
manipulation extend beyond witnesses' self-rated 
confidence to jurors' perceptions of eyewitness 
credibility? 
Experiment 2 addressed this question by 
presenting the testimony videotapes to subject-jurors, 
asking them to evaluate the eyewitnesses' perceived 
credibility. The subject-jurors of this second 
experiment never experienced the feedback manipulation 
directly. Instead, their experience with this 
variable could come only through the words and 
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demeanor of the witnesses who had experienced these 
manipulations. 
Previous research showing that eyewitness 
confidence is closely associated with perceived 
accuracy, believability, and credibility has been 
primarily correlational (i.e., simply documenting that 
witnesses who are more confident tend to also be 
perceived as more credible). Here the question is 
whether manipulated confidence affects perceived 
credibility. As noted previously, the current 
research is only the second investigation of 
confidence malleability. It is the first study of the 
role of social influence in eyewitness certainty. 
Given the array of social influences that could 
potentially affect eyewitness confidence (e.g., co-
eyewitnesses, police officers, and attorneys) and the 
power of this variable to influence jurors' 
assessments of eyewitness credibility, it is important 
to determine how manipulated confidence affects both 
witnesses and jurors. Experiment 1 yielded some 
understanding of social influence and eyewitness 
confidence. Experiment 2 provides insight into social 
influence and jurors' assessments of eyewitness 
credibility. 
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Participants and Design 
Three hundred and seventy-eight undergraduate 
students participated in exchange for extra course 
credit. Participants were told that a participant in 
a previous experiment had witnessed a theft from one 
of the experimenter's laboratories. The experimenter 
explained that this witness had first identified the 
thief from a set of photographs and then responded to 
a campus security officer's questions concerning their 
memories for the event while being videotaped. 
Participants were told that their task was to view the 
videotaped testimony and then complete a questionnaire 
concerning their impressions of the witness's 
credibility. The design was the same as in Experiment 
1 in that there were 9 conditions: (1) No 
Information, (2) Same ID, (3) Not There, (4) Different 
ID, (5) Implausibly Different ID, (6) Different/Same, 
(7) Same/Different, (8) Same/Withdraw, 
(9)Different/Withdraw (see Table 1). Experiment 2 
participants, however, were never told about the co-
witness information witnesses had received. Instead, 
as noted previously, their experience with this 
variable could come only through the words and 
demeanor of the witnesses. 
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Procedure 
Participants were tested in groups of 2 - 4. 
Each person was seated in front of a television 
monitor and asked to watch one of the Experiment 1 
testimony videotapes. After viewing the videotaped 
testimony, participants were asked to judge the 
following (on 7-point scales); (1) the extent to 
which they believed the witness made an accurate 
identification, (2) the extent to which they believed 
the witness was accurate in his/her description of the 
physical characteristics of the thief, (3) how 
detailed was the witness's description of the thief, 
(4) how good was the witness's view of the thief (see 
Appendix B), (5) the confidence of the witness in 
testifying (6) the accuracy of the witness's 
testimony, (7) the believability of the witness's 
testimony, (8) "the extent to which the witness was 
able to persuade you that he/she had a good memory for 
the witnessed event" (see Appendix C). These measures 
will hereafter be referred to as: (1) perceived 
identification accuracy, (2) perceived description 
accuracy, (3) description detail, (4) perceived view, 
(5) examination confidence, (6) examination accuracy, 
(7) believability, and (8) testimony persuasiveness. 
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respectively. 
Participants also responded to a questionnaire 
concerning their willingness to convict the accused on 
the basis of the witness's testimony, subsequently 
called the "conviction measure". This measure asked 
subject-jurors to indicate their willingness to 
convict the accused given pieces of evidence that 
varied in terms of how incriminating they were. For 
example, participants were asked whether they would be 
willing to convict the accused if (1) the accused was 
found in the vicinity of the crime or (2) the stolen 
equipment was found in the accused's apartment (see 
Appendix D). The categories of information were 
structured to be successively increasing in terms of 
how incriminating the information contained therein 
was. This was accomplished by adding new evidence at 
each level. 
Results 
Initial analyses of the correlations among the 
eight primary measures, namely perceived 
identification accuracy, perceived description 
accuracy, description detail, perceived view, 
perceived examination confidence, perceived 
examination accuracy, believability, and testimony 
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persuasiveness were conducted. These correlations are 
reported in Table 2. These measures were all highly 
intercorrelated (all ps < .001). This pattern of 
correlations indicated that a multivariate analysis of 
these measures would be appropriate. 
Multivariate effects 
A Multivariate Analysis of Variance (MANOVA) of 
Identification Feedback on subject-jurors' ratings of 
perceived identification accuracy, perceived 
description accuracy, description detail, perceived 
view, examination confidence, examination accuracy, 
believability, and testimony persuasiveness yielded a 
significant main effect for identification feedback, 
wilk's Lamda = .48, £ (7, 363) = 83.32, E < .0001. 
Perceived identification accuracy 
Mean ratings by subject-jurors for witnesses from 
the nine information conditions (see Table 1) were 
4.16, 5.00. 2.68, 3.05, 4.85, 2.69, 5.07, 5.40, 3.55, 
respectively. Newman-Keuls analyses revealed that 
witnesses who were told that a co-eyewitness 
identified either a "dissimilar other" or the same 
person they did were perceived as more likely to have 
made an accurate identification than witnesses given 
no information (g < .05). This effect held in the two 
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Table 2 
Correlations Among Dependent Measures 
I II III IV V VI VII VIII IX 
I X .63 .51 .67 .65 .70 .60 .67 .32 
II .63 X .54 .63 .63 .74 .68 .71 .38 
III .51 .54 X .57 .54 .54 .46 .57 .28 
IV .67 .63 .57 X .62 . 66 .56 .65 .31 
V .65 .62 .54 .62 X .76 .69 .76 .31 
VI .70 .74 .54 .66 .76 X .78 .79 .38 
VII .60 . 68 .46 .56 .69 .78 X .71 .33 
VIII .67 .71 .57 .65 .76 .79 .70 X .38 
IX .32 .38 .27 .31 .31 .37 .33 .37 X 
Note: All correlations significant at g < .0001. 
I. ID accuracy 
III. Detail 
V. Examination 
confidence 
VII. Believability 
IX. Conviction 
measure 
II. Description 
accuracy 
IV. View 
VI. Examination 
accuracy 
VIII. Persuasiveness 
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conditions where the confirmatory feedback was 
subsequently corrected. That is, witnesses who were 
first told that a co-eyewitness identified the same 
person they did and subsequently provided with revised 
information suggesting either that the co-eyewitness 
identified a "similar other" or that the experimenter 
"was not sure who the other person identified" were 
also perceived as more accurate in their 
identifications than witnesses who were given no 
information (e < .05). These results are displayed in 
Figure 2. Witnesses who were told that a co-
eyewitness either rejected the photospread or 
identified a "similar other" were perceived as less 
likely to have made an accurate identification than 
witnesses who were given no information (p < .05). 
Witnesses for whom the information that a co-
eyewitness had identified a "similar other" was later 
either withdrawn (experimenter was "not sure who the 
other person identified") or corrected ("the other 
person actually identified the same person you did") 
were also seen as less likely to have correctly chosen 
the thief from the lineup than witneses who were given 
no information (p < .05) (see Figure 2). 
Figure Caption 
Figure 2 Perceived identification accuracy as a function of 
identification feedback (Note: Means not sharing a common 
letter differ at E<.05) 
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there ID plaus same diff with with 
INFORMATION 
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Perceived description accuracy 
Mean ratings by subject-jurors for witnesses from 
the nine information conditions were 4.26, 4.77, 3.38, 
3.45, 5.18, 3.39, 4.97, 4.81, 4.13, respectively. 
Eyewitnesses who were told that a co-eyewitness 
identified a "dissimilar other" were judged as having 
provided more accurate descriptions of the thief than 
witnesses who were given no information (p < .05) 
This was also true of witnesses in the 
"same/different" condition (see Figure 3). 
Witnesses who had been told either that a co-
eyewitness rejected the photospread or that a co-
eyewitness identified a "similar other" were perceived 
as less accurate in their descriptions of the thief 
than witnesses who were given no information 
(P < .05). This perception of reduced accuracy 
relative to witnesses who received no information also 
held for witnesses who were first told that a co-
eyewitness identified a "similar other" then 
subsequently informed that the co-eyewitness actually 
identified the same person they did (p < .05). 
Witnesses given no information did not differ from 
witnesses who were told that a co-eyewitness 
identified the same person they did or for whom this 
Figure Caption 
Figure 3 Perceived description accuracy as a function of 
identification feedback (Note; Means not sharing a common 
letter differ at p<.05) 
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information was subsequently corrected 
("same/different" condition). Nor did 
witnesses who were given no information differ from 
witnesses in either of the two conditions where the 
original information was subsequently withdrawn 
(experimenter was "not sure who the other person 
identified") in terms of perceived description 
accuracy (see Figure 3). 
Description detail 
Mean ratings by subject-jurors for witnesses from 
the nine information conditions were 3.02, 3.74, 2.15, 
2.74, 4.13, 2.69, 3.63, 3.91, 2.81, respectively. 
Witnesses who were told that a co-eyewitness either 
agreed with their identification or identified an 
"implausible other" were judged as having provided 
more detailed descriptions of the thief than witnesses 
who were given no information (e < .05). This was 
also the case for witnesses who were initially told 
that a co-eyewitness agreed with their identification 
but for whom this information was subsequently either 
corrected ("same/different" condition) or withdrawn 
("same/withdraw" condition) (e < .05) (see Figure 4). 
Witnesses who were told that a co-eyewitness 
rejected the photospread were judged as having 
Figure Caption 
Figure 4 Description detail as a function of identification 
feedback (Note: Means not sharing a common letter 
differ at p<.05) 
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provided less detailed descriptions of the thief than 
witnesses who were given no information (g < .05). 
The descriptions of witnesses from every remaining 
feedback condition were judged as accurate as 
descriptions provided by witnesses who were given no 
information (see Figure 4). 
Perceived view 
Mean ratings by subject-jurors for witnesses from 
the nine information conditions were 3.51, 4.40, 2.25, 
2.95, 4.41, 3.00, 4.66, 4.53, 3.47, respectively. 
Witnesses from the following conditions were perceived 
as having had a better view of the thief than 
witnesses who were given no information: (1) 
witnesses were told that a co-eyewitness agreed with 
their identification, (2) witnesses were told that a 
co-eyewitness identified a different person who looked 
dissimilar to their choice, (3) witnesses were 
initially told that a co-eyewitness identified the 
same person but subsequently informed that the co-
eyewitness identified a different person who looked 
similar to their choice, (4) witnesses were initially 
told that a co-eyewitness identified the same person 
but subsequently informed that the experimenter was 
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not sure who the co-eyewitness identified 
(all ES < .05) (see Figure 5). 
Witnesses who were told that a co-eyewitness 
rejected the photospread were perceived as having had 
a poorer view of the thief than witnesses who were 
given no information (e < .05). Witnesses who were 
told that a co-eyewitness identified a similar other 
or for whom this original information was subsequently 
corrected (experimenter claimed that the co-eyewitness 
actually identified the same person they did) or 
withdrawn (experimenter claimed she was not sure who 
the co-eyewitness identified) were perceived as having 
had an equally good view of the thief as witnesses who 
were given no information (es < .05) (see Figure 5). 
Testimony accuracy 
Mean ratings by subject-jurors for witnesses from 
the nine information conditions were 3.98, 4.67, 3.53, 
3.62, 4.97, 3.31, 4.94, 4.83, 3.87, respectively. 
Witnesses from the following conditions were perceived 
as having provided more accurate testimony than 
witnesses who were given no information: (1) 
witnesses who were told that a co-eyewitness agreed 
with their identification, (2) witnesses who were told 
that a co-eyewitness identified a different person who 
Figure Caption 
Figure 5 Perceived view as a function of identification 
feedback (Note: Means not sharing a common letter 
differ at B<.05) 
no same not diff im- diff/same^ame/diff/ 
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looked dissimilar to their choice, (3) witnesses who 
were initially told that a co-eyewitness agreed with 
their identification but subsequently informed that 
the co-eyewitness actually identified a different 
person who looked similar to their choice, (4) 
witnesses who were initially told that a co-eyewitness 
agreed with their identification but subsequently 
informed that the experimenter was not sure who the 
co-eyewitness identified (e < .05) (see Figure 6). 
The testimony of witnesses who were told that a 
co-eyewitness either rejected the photospread or 
identified a different person who looked similar to 
their choice was perceived as equally accurate as 
testimony provided by witnesses who had received no 
information. This was also true of witnesses who were 
initially told that a co-eyewitness identified a 
"similar other" but subsequently informed that the co-
eyewitness either identified the same person they did 
or that the experimenter was not sure who the co-
eyewitness identified (see Figure 6). 
Perceived examination confidence 
Mean ratings by subject-jurors for witnesses from 
the nine information conditions were 4.33, 5.09, 3.10, 
3.41, 5.26, 3.33, 5.09, 5.02, 3.98, respectively. 
Figure Caption 
Figure 6 Examination accuracy as a function of 
identification feedback (Note: Means not sharing a common 
letter differ at E<.05) 
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Witnesses who were told that a co-eyewitness 
identified a different person who looked dissimilar to 
their choice were perceived as more confident in 
testifying than witnesses who were given no 
information (e < .05) (see Figure 7). 
Witnesses who were told that a co-eyewitness 
either rejected the photospread or identified a 
different person who looked similar to their choice or 
for whom this latter information was subsequently 
either corrected (witness actually identified the same 
person they did) or withdrawn (experimenter was not 
sure who the other witness identified) were perceived 
as less confident in testifying than witnesses who 
were given no information (gs < .05) (see Figure 7). 
Witnesses who were told that a co-eyewitness agreed 
with their identification or for whom this information 
was subsequently either corrected ("same/different" 
condition) or withdrawn ("same/withdraw" condition) 
(ES < .05) were seen as equally confident in 
testifying as witnesses who were given no information 
(see Figure 7). 
Figure Caption 
Figure 7 Perceived examination confidence as a function of 
identification feedback (Note; Means not sharing a common 
letter differ at ^ <.05) 
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Believability 
Mean ratings by subject-jurors for witnesses from 
the nine information conditions were 4.70, 4.88, 3.88, 
4.05, 5.49, 3.94, 5.29, 5.06, 4.43, respectively. A 
one-way analysis of variance on believability revealed 
a significant between-groups effect, F (8, 369) = 
14.03, E < .05. However, a subsequent Newman-Keuls 
analysis indicated that witnesses from every feedback 
condition were perceived as equally believable as 
witnesses who were given no information (see 
Figure 8). 
Testimony persuasiveness 
Mean ratings by subject-jurors for witnesses from 
the nine information conditions were 3.68, 4.61, 2.73, 
3.14, 4.97, 3.00, 4.69, 4.55, 3.32, respectively. 
Subject-jurors judged witnesses from the following 
conditions as more persuasive in communicating a good 
memory for the witnessed event than witnesses who 
received no information: (1) witnesses who were told 
that a co-eyewitness agreed with their identification, 
(2) witnesses who were told that a co-eyewitness 
identified a different person who looked dissimilar to 
their choice, (3) witnesses who were initially told 
that a co-eyewitness agreed with their identification 
Figure Caption 
Figure 8 Believability as a function of identification 
feedback 
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but subsequently Informed that the co-eyewitness 
actually identified the same person they did, (4) 
witnesses who were initially told that a co-eyewitness 
identified the same person they did but subsequently 
informed that the experimenter was not sure who the 
co-eyewitness identified (all ps < .05) (see Figure 
9). 
Witnesses who were told that a co-eyewitness 
rejected the photospread were perceived as less 
persuasive in communicating an accurate memory for the 
witnessed event than witnesses who received no 
information (g < .05). Witness who were told that a 
co-eyewitness identified a different person who looked 
similar to their choice and witnesses for whom this 
information was subsequently either corrected (co-
eyewitness actually identified the same person) or 
withdrawn (experimenter claimed that she was not sure 
who the other person identified) were perceived as 
equally persuasive in communicating an accurate memory 
for the event than witnesses who received no 
information (see Figure 9). 
Conviction measure 
Mean ratings by subject-jurors for witnesses from 
the nine information condtions were 3.88, 4.43, 3.44, 
Figure Caption 
Figure 9 Testimony persuasiveness as a function of 
identification feedback (Note: Means not sharing a common 
letter differ at p<.05) 
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Figure Caption 
Figure 10 Willingness to convict as a function of 
identification feedback (Note: Means not sharing a common 
letter differ at e<.05) 
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3.77, 4.15, 3.82, 4.86, 4.44, 4.22, respectively. 
Subjects were more willing to convict the accused when 
she had been identified by one of the witnesses who 
were initially told that a co-eyewitness agreed with 
their identification but subsequently informed that 
the witness had actually identified a different person 
than when she was identified by one of the witnesses who 
had received no information (p < .05). All remaining 
feedback conditions did not differ from the no information 
condition. These results are displayed in Figure 10. 
Discussion 
Experiment 1 demonstrated that eyewitness 
confidence can be both raised and lowered by providing 
witnesses with information concerning the 
identification decision of a co-eyewitness to a theft. 
The findings of Experiment 2 indicate that the 
information concerning a co-eyewitness's 
identification decision not only affected 
eyewitnesses' confidence ratings but also affected 
jurors' assessments of these witnesses' credibility. 
The effects of the identification feedback 
extended beyond eyewitnesses' self-rated confidence to 
jurors' ratings on every credibility measure except 
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bellevability. None of the types of information 
produced a significant departure from the control (no 
information) condition for subject-jurors' ratings of 
believability. Perhaps this is because subject-jurors 
failed to attach the intended meaning to this measure. 
Jurors may have interpreted believability to mean 
honest or trustworthy. However, the feedback 
manipulation was not expected to produce differences 
in perceptions of witnesses' propensity to truthfully 
recount their memories for the theft. Believability 
is not included in any of the following discussion of 
perceived credibility. 
Witnesses in the Implausibly-Different ID 
condition were always perceived as more credible than 
witnesses given no information. This follows the 
pattern observed in Experiment 1 where witnesses in 
the Implausibly Different ID condition were more 
confident about their identifications than witnesses 
in the control condition. With this type of 
information, heightened self-rated confidence 
evidently translated into heightened perceived 
credibility. 
The other types of information produced 
credibility ratings that varied somewhat from the 
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pattern of witnesses' self-rated confidence across 
information conditions. In no case did the feedback 
manipulation produce credibility ratings completely 
contrary to the confidence ratings of the first 
experiment. That is, in no case did jurors either (1) 
perceive witnesses whose confidence increased relative 
to the control condition as less confident than 
control condition witnesses or (2) perceive witnesses 
whose confidence decreased as more confident than 
control condition witnesses. Instead, in some 
information conditions, jurors perceived witnesses 
whose confidence either increased or decreased as a 
function of their information they received as no more 
credible than witnesses who received no information. 
Overall, the feedback effects observed in this 
second experiment are generally consistent with the 
findings of Experiment 1. That is, subject-jurors' 
credibility ratings generally parallel witnesses' 
confidence ratings. The fact that the credibility 
ratings did not exactly match the witnesses' 
confidence ratings is not surprising, given that none 
of the credibility measures exactly matched the 
measure of witnesses' self-rated confidence. Whereas 
subject-witnesses rated their confidence in having 
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accurately identified the thief, subject-jurors were 
not asked to estimate witnesses' identification 
confidence. Instead, subject-jurors were asked to 
make more ecologically valid assessments (e.g., to 
what extent they believed the witness had made an 
accurate identification, how believable and accurate 
was the witness's testimony). 
For the credibility measure most closely related 
to self-rated confidence, perceived identification 
accuracy, the pattern of jurors' ratings was almost 
identical to that of witnesses' own confidence ratings 
(see Figures 1 and 2). There was only one difference 
in the pattern of results observed among witnesses and 
jurors. This discrepancy lies in the condition where 
witnesses were initially told that a co-eyewitness 
identified a different person and subsequently 
informed that the experimenter was actually not sure 
who the co-eyewitness identified. Self-rated 
confidence was deflated by the initial news but the 
subsequent news restored it to the same level observed 
among witnesses who received no information. Subject-
jurors seemed insensitive to this rise in confidence. 
They rated this group of witnesses as less likely to 
have made a correct identification than witnesses who 
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were given no information and no more likely to be 
accurate than witnesses in the Different/Same 
condition. 
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GENERAL DISCUSSION 
This research was designed to test the hypothesis 
that eyewitness confidence can be either raised and 
lowered by external, interpersonal sources. The 
results provide support for this hypothesis; 
eyewitness confidence was successfully raised or 
lowered by providing witnesses with information 
concerning the identification decision of a co-witness 
to a staged theft. 
The feedback effects observed in the first 
experiment suggest that a simple statement by a co-
witness can serve as a powerful source of social 
influence in eyewitness identification situations. In 
this study, the co-witness information served as a 
source of informational social influence. That is, 
witnesses used it to gauge the appropriateness of 
their lineup choices and thus derive a sense of 
certainty in having made an accurate identification. 
It is interesting to note that eyewitness 
confidence reached levels as high as 8.77 on a 10-
point scale (Implausibly-Different ID condition) in a 
situation where all witnesses made false 
identifications. Despite the fact that all witnesses 
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made false identifications, in the "same" condition, 
93% of subjects gave confidence ratings of 8 or above 
on a 10-point scale whereas only 7% did so in the "not 
there" condition. This study shows that extreme 
amounts of systematic variance can be attributed to 
social influence factors. 
Would social influence factors produce such 
robust changes in confidence in actual eyewitness 
identification situations? The incidence of false 
identifications (96%) observed in the current study 
would not be expected in actual eyewitness situations. 
Recall that in this study a target-absent lineup 
combined with biased lineup instructions were used to 
obtain false identifications. In actual cases, where 
unbiased instructions and target-present lineups are 
used, some unknown, perhaps high, percentage of 
accurate identifications would be obtained (Malpass & 
Devine, 1981a). 
Confidence associated with correct 
identifications might be less malleable than certainty 
in inaccurate identifications. Indeed, the Wells et 
al. (1979) confidence malleability study found that 
their manipulation of confidence produced 
statistically significant increases in expressed 
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confidence for inaccurate but not accurate eyewitness 
identifications. Note, however, that whereas the 
Wells et al. study dealt exclusively with increases in 
eyewitness certainty, the current research examined 
both increases and decreases in eyewitness certainty. 
It might be the case that certainty in accurate 
identifications cannot be enhanced by social factors 
because of a ceiling effect for accurate eyewitness 
identifications. Perhaps certainty in accurate 
identifications can be reduced by social factors. 
Aside from the administration of the lineup, 
however, the current study is very high in ecological 
validity. Indeed, witnesses were led to believe that 
the crime was real and that their identifications and 
testimony would be used to aid the investigation of 
the theft. The current findings then probably do 
generalize to actual cases where two witnesses to a 
crime each learn of the identification decision of the 
other. 
What Is Eyewitness Confidence? 
The current findings suggest an answer to the 
question of what is eyewitness confidence. As noted 
previously, no research has yet defined eyewitness 
confidence beyond saying that it is a witness's belief 
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in the accuracy of his or her testimony. The present 
results clearly demonstrate that eyewitness 
identification certainty is not merely a statement by 
the witness of the extent to which the identified 
person resembles the witness's memory for the culprit. 
Any degree of resemblance (or lack thereof) between 
the witness's recollection of the culprit and the 
person identified by the witness was randomized across 
the nine conditions of the experiment. The large and 
reliable differences in eyewitness certainty across 
conditions owe instead to social influence processes 
that were triggered by information regarding the 
identification behaviors of the co-witness. 
Recall the distinction noted previously between 
primitive and nonprimitive beliefs. Whereas 
primitive beliefs derive from direct contact with the 
belief object, nonprimitive beliefs are derived from 
inferences that arise from factors other than direct 
experience with the belief object. Although primitive 
beliefs might be associated with high levels of 
certainty and be largely intractable, nonprimitive 
beliefs can be quite tractable as a function of new 
information. 
The results of this research suggest that 
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eyewitness identification confidence is the strength 
or intensity of a nonprimitive belief that the 
identified person and the culprit are one and the same 
person. Witnesses derived their beliefs in having 
made an accurate identification from the co-witness 
information, rather than from their memories for the 
culprit. Their confidence was indeed tractable as a 
function of the co-witness information they received. 
The Process Underlying Changes in Confidence 
A primary goal of this research was to examine 
the process underlying changes in confidence arising 
from external, social forces. The results suggest 
that the changes in certainty that resulted from the 
feedback manipulation were not due to a simple notion 
of social support wherein certainty increased or 
decreased merely because there was or was not an ally 
for the witness. Instead, it appears that the changes 
in certainty became somewhat autonomous from the co-
witness information. 
The fact that the implausibly different condition 
increased rather than decreased the witnesses' 
confidence indicates that certainty is not a simple 
ally effect. Furthermore, witnesses in the Same %D 
and Implausiblv-different ID conditions provided more 
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detailed descriptions of the thief than did witnesses 
in the control (H2 information) condition. Yet, the 
viewing conditions were held constant across 
conditions. These witnesses then did not actually see 
more and thus remember more about the theft but rather 
came to believe that they could remember more because 
of the feedback they had received. Finally, if the 
changes in confidence were due to social support, 
witnesses who were told initially that the co-witness 
had identified the same person and then were told that 
this information was incorrect (e.g., that the witness 
actually had identified a different person), should 
have lowered their certainty ratings owing to a loss 
of an ally. Instead, however, the inflated confidence 
persevered. This perseverance effect occurred in 
spite of the fact that witness certainty was not 
measured until after the corrected information was 
given to the witness. Hence, it seems that the 
effects of co-witness information on witness certainty 
became somewhat autonomous from the information 
itself. 
These data suggest one reason why eyewitness 
certainty and eyewitness identification accuracy are 
not likely to be well correlated by the time witnesses 
108 
take the stand in actual cases. Specifically, 
eyewitnesses might commonly learn about the 
identification decisions of other witnesses prior to 
the trial or learn about other evidence that is 
consistent or inconsistent with their identification 
decision. An eyewitness, for example, might make a 
tentative identification and later learn that the 
suspect was in possession of stolen goods or that he 
or she had committed a similar offense in the past. 
The perseverance finding suggests that even if post-
identification information subsequently proves to be 
wrong, the effect of chat information might live on 
nonetheless. For example, if initial reports by 
police indicated that the identified person was found 
in possession of the stolen goods and, prior to trial, 
the witness learned that those were actually not the 
stolen goods, any certainty-inflating effects might 
not be eliminated by the new, corrected information. 
Implications of Confidence Malleability 
Any changes in eyewitness identification 
confidence by external, social factors likely 
perpetuate additional effects in other situations 
(e.g., in preliminary hearings, in court). Experiment 
2 demonstrated that the co-witness information not 
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only affected eyewitnesses' confidence ratings but 
also affected jurors' ratings of these witnesses' 
credibility. In some conditions, a simple statement 
from a co-witness produced significant increases in 
the perceived credibility of inaccurate witnesses. 
Clearly, changes in eyewitness certainty, without 
corresponding changes in accuracy, pose as serious a 
threat to jurors' ability to distinguish accurate from 
inaccurate identification testimony as do changes in 
eyewitness memory. The United States judiciary has 
ruled that confidence should be used to infer 
testimony accuracy (Neil v. Diggers, 1972). The 
current findings suggest that we should not 
necessarily expect a relationship between eyewitness 
identification accuracy and certainty. Social 
influences can alter eyewitness confidence 
independently of accuracy, thereby eliminating any 
relationship between confidence and accuracy that 
might already exist. 
Any such adjustments that witnesses make in their 
level of confidence probably weaken the probative 
value of eyewitness identification testimony because 
triers of fact will be likely to "double count" the 
evidence. That is, they will likely treat two pieces 
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of correlated evidence as though they are independent, 
thus assigning more weight to the evidence than is 
warranted. 
In the current study, for example, witnesses came 
to feel more certain about their identifications upon 
learning that their co-witness identified the same 
person they did. Were it a real case, two witnesses 
would have been shown to have identified the same 
defendant. Such agreement is likely to be highly 
incriminating in the minds of jurors. In addition, 
jurors would likely be more impressed by the fact that 
both witnesses are highly confident. If the 
witnesses' confidence levels were truly independent of 
the fact that they agreed (e.g., each was unaware of 
the identification made by the co-witness), jurors 
would be appropriately impressed. On the other hand, 
if the confidence levels are not independent, then 
high confidence occurs because of agreement and 
counting confidence as additional probative evidence 
is "double counting" and misleading. 
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PRACTICE AMD POLICY IMPLICATIONS 
One clear recommendation from the current results 
is that police should routinely obtain statements from 
witnesses when they make identifications prior to the 
possible interfering effects of post-identification 
information. 
Previous research has shown that a witness's 
memory of the perpetrator's face can be altered by a 
co-witness's statement concerning the perpetrator's 
appearance (Loftus & Greene, 1980). Loftus and Greene 
demonstrated that memories for particular details such 
as hair texture or facial hair may be altered by co-
witness information concerning the perpetrator's 
appearance. Consistent with this finding, current 
legal practice is to keep witnesses separate until 
identifications are made. 
The current research suggests that perhaps 
witnesses should be kept apart even after they have 
made their identifications. Informing each other of 
their respective identification decisions could alter 
witnesses' confidence in their identifications. Such 
alterations in confidence could, in turn, influence 
jurors' perceptions of the witnesses' credibility. 
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The current findings also suggest a 
recommendation concerning the post-identification 
interactions between police officers and eyewitnesses. 
Recall that in this research the co-witness 
information was not communicated directly from one 
witness to another. Instead, the experimenter was 
responsible for providing the information that 
produced such dramatic shifts in eyewitness certainty. 
This finding suggests that police officers should be 
cautioned to maintain the confidentiality of each 
witness's identification decision. 
Realistically, however, this confidentiality 
could not be guaranteed. Even if police were to 
withhold this information from witnesses, the witness 
could still learn about a co-witness's identification 
(or other evidence that is either consistent or 
inconsistent with their identification) from media 
reports concerning the witnessed-event. Thus, it 
seems more reasonable to recommend that police 
routinely take statements of certainty from witnesses 
when they make their identifications prior to the 
possible interfering effects of post-identification 
information. 
The legal system is particularly concerned about 
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the dangers of making judicial rulings that could have 
the effect of producing an incentive for one or the 
other side in a legal dispute to distort evidence. 
The U. S. Supreme Court's ruling in Neil v. Biggers 
(1972) could have such an adverse incentive effect. 
In its failure to specify some limiting conditions 
(such as being wary of eyewitness certainty when it is 
assessed after the eyewitness has had a chance to be 
influenced by other information), the Court has given 
police and prosecutors considerable leeway for 
exercising arbitrary influence over the credibility of 
identification evidence. Although scientific studies 
of eyewitness behavior were virtually absent when the 
Court made its ruling, the two decades post Neil v. 
Biggers have produced a body of knowledge that calls 
for a more coherent, complete, and scientifically 
defensible statement from the Court on the matter of 
eyewitness certainty. 
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SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
Future research could be designed to yield an 
understanding of why learning that a co-witness 
identified an implausible alternative enhanced, rather 
than merely nullified a decrease in confidence. As 
noted previously, this result might be attributable to 
a "conservatism" process going on in the control (no 
information) condition. Witnesses given no 
information might have provided conservative estimates 
of their confidence because they feared that they 
would regret appearing confident if their co-witness 
had chosen the viable alternative. This 
interpretation could be tested by including a 
condition in which there was no co-witness. If there 
was conservatism in the control condition owing to 
uncertainty about what the other witness had done, a 
no co-witness condition should produce a higher mean 
level of confidence than the control condition. 
Future research could also address the issue of 
the role of characteristics of the co-witness in the 
impact of co-witness information on eyewitness 
certainty. What if the identification task was 
structured such that the co-witness obtained a better 
or worse view of the perpetrator? Would the 
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confidence-altering effects remain unchanged? Or 
would eyewitnesses consider the "goodness" of the view 
that their co-witness had in the same way that people 
are sensitive to the expertise of the source of 
information? 
Characteristics of the source o± the information 
could potentially influence the persuasive power of 
the information. To the extent that viewing 
conditions are regarded as an index of co-witness 
credibility, co-witnesses perceived as having had a 
better view of the perpetrator should more powerfully 
influence a witness's identification confidence than 
should witnesses afforded a worse view (see Petty & 
Cacioppo, (1986) for a discussion of source 
characteristics in persuasion). 
The current research involved only one co-
witness. In actual cases, there may be multiple 
witnesses to an event. Future research could assess 
the impact of more than one piece of co-witness 
information on eyewitness confidence. For example, a 
study varying the number of co-witnesses could be 
designed to compare a control (no information) with 
conditions wherein (a) one co-witness agrees and the 
second disagrees with the witness's identification, 
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(b) two co-witnesses agrees but a third disagrees with 
the witness's identification, and so on. 
Further studies could introduce a delay interval 
to the current study. It is possible that witnesses 
in this study were not given enough time to really 
think about how confident or nonconfident they were 
before getting the co-witness information. If this 
were the case, witnesses might prove resistant to the 
confidence malleability effects of co-witness 
information given a delay interval long enough for 
them to solidify their feelings of certainty. 
It would also be interesting to know how subject-
jurors would react if they knew that feedback had 
occurred. Would they know to discount high confidence 
under such circumstances? This question has important 
practical implications. If jurors are able to 
discount high confidence under such circumstances, 
there would be no need to shield witnesses from 
information concerning a co-witness's identification. 
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CONCLUDING REMARKS 
The' malleability of eyewitness confidence 
independent of eyewitness accuracy merits serious 
consideration. The current findings suggest how 
easily witnesses can come to feel more certain about 
false identifications. Confident yet mistaken 
eyewitness identifications are the principal single 
cause of wrongful convictions of innocent persons 
(Huff, Ratner, & Sagarin, 1986). Consider, for 
example, the case of Lenell Geter. Geter was 
convicted of armed robbery and sentenced to life in 
prison on the basis of the testimony of five 
individuals who mistakenly identified him as the 
thief. This sentence was imposed despite Geter's 
strong alibi - nine of his co-workers swore that he 
was at work at the time of the robbery. Not until 
almost two years after the crime was Geter released 
from prison - not until another supsect was identified 
by four of the five eyewitnesses. 
The current findings support Deffenbacher's 
(1980) recommendation that the judiciary should cease 
to rely on eyewitness certainty as a predictor of 
accuracy. Social influences can alter eyewitness 
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confidence independently of accuracy, thereby 
destroying any existing relationship between 
confidence and accuracy. 
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FOOTNOTES 
1. In the eyewitness literature it is unusual to, as 
was the case in this experiment, wait until witnesses 
have provided their testimony to inform them that the 
crime was staged. Although subject-witnesses might 
not know that the event in question was a staged event 
while witnessing it, they usually learn it was staged 
before making an identification in most studies. For 
most eyewitness identification studies, it is not 
necessary to continue the ruse. In this study, 
however, it is absolutely essential that the primary 
dependent measure (confidence) be collected prior to 
informing witnesses that the crime was staged. 
Otherwise, participants would assume that the 
experimenter and the security officer already know who 
the "thief" was. This assumption would attach an 
entirely different meaning to the feedback than what 
was intended in this study. The goal here was to 
create an ecologically valid manipulation of 
eyewitness confidence. In actual eyewitness 
situations, a co-eyewitness can either agree or 
disagree with a witness's identification decision. 
The co-eyewitness cannot confirm the accuracy of the 
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witness's identification. Neither can the police 
officer who administers the lineup. Were witnesses in 
the current study debriefed prior to the 
identification, the experimenter could still provide 
witnesses with information concerning a co-
eyewitness's identification decision. However, now 
the experimenter can confirm the accuracy of the 
witness's identification. Participants would thus 
likely be more interested in feedback from the 
experimenter than a co-eyewitness. They would 
probably dismiss or give little consideration to the 
information concerning a co-eyewitness's 
identification, knowing that the experimenter could 
tell them whether or not they had made an accurate 
identification. 
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APPENDIX A 
Interview Script 
You witnessed an alleged theft of some recording 
equipment? 
Where were you at the time? 
Can you describe the person who took the equipment 
from the room? 
What was she wearing? 
How good a view did you get of her? 
Approximately how long was she in view? 
Of that time, how long was her face in view? 
Do you think the other witness had a better view, the 
same view, or a worse view than you did? 
Do you wear glasses? 
(If "yes"; were you wearing them at the time?) 
Do you have any problem with your vision of which you 
are aware? 
Do you think you would be able to pick this woman out 
of a crowded classroom? 
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Are you generally good at recognizing and identifying 
people? 
Would you be willing to testify if you were called to 
do so? 
The instructor mentioned that you looked at some 
photographs. Did you make an identification? 
How confident do you feel about that identification? 
Say, for example, on a scale of 1 to 10, with 1 
being"not very confident" and 10 being "extremely 
confident", how confident do you feel about your 
identification? 
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APPENDIX B 
The witness either: 
(a) made an identification from the set of photographs he/she was shown or 
(b) stated that the person who stole the equipment was not present in 
the set of photos. 
la. If the witness made an identification from the photos: 
Please use the scale below to indicate the degree to which 
you believe the witness correctly identified the thief. 
do not believe convinced the 
witness made an witness mëuie an 
accurate ID accurate ID 
lb. If the witness did not make an identification from the photos: 
Please use the scale below to indicate the degree to which you 
believe the witness was accurate in stating that the thief was 
not present in the set of photos. 
do not believe convinced witness 
witness was correct correctly stated 
in stating the thief that the thief 
was not present was not present 
2. To what extent do you feel the witness was accurate in his/her 
description of the physical characteristics of the thief? 
not at all completely 
accurate accurate 
3. How detailed was the witness' account of the theft, including the 
actions of the thitf? 
very few a great number 
details of details 
4. How good do you feel was the witness' view of the thief? 
very poor view 
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APPEMDIZ C 
Whereas the previous questions asked you very specific questions ëibout 
the witness' testimony, the questions below ask you to consider your 
overall impression of the witness' testimony. 
4. In general, how confident did the witness appear in testifying? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
not at all * very 
confident confident 
5. In general, how accurate do you feel the witness was in testifying? 
1 2 3 4 5— 6 7 
not at all very 
accurate accurate 
6. In general, how believable was the witness' testimony? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
not at all very 
believable believable 
7. To what extent was the witness able to persuade you that he/she 
hcui a good memory for the witnessed event? 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 
not at all very much 
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APPENDIX D 
If the witness made an identification, please respond to the 
question below 
The following question concerns your willingness to convict the person 
identified as the thief by the witness you viewed on videotape. We are interested 
in how much, or what level, of evidence would be sufficient for you to decide 
that the person identified by the witness is, in fact, guilty and should be 
convicted of the theft. 
Please indicate the evidence you would consider necessary to convict by marking 
an "X" beside one of the following statements. 
The witness' testimony alone would be sufficient for me to convict. 
I would need the witness' testimony plus I would need to know that: 
the person IDed had a prior theft conviction. 
the person IDed had a prior theft conviction and 
the person IDed worked in the building where the theft occured 
the person IDed had a prior theft conviction and 
the person IDed worked in the building where the theft occurred and 
another witness also identified this person 
the person IDed had a prior theft conviction and 
the person IDed worked in the building where the theft occurred and 
another witness also identified this person and 
a possession of the person IDed was found at the crime scene 
the person IDed had a prior theft conviction and 
the person IDed worked in the building where the theft occurred and 
another witness also identified this person and 
a possession of the person IDed was found at the crime scene and 
the stolen equipment was found in the bedroom of the person IDed 
the person IDed had a prior theft conviction and 
the person IDed worked in the building where the theft occurred and 
another witness also identified this person and 
a possession of the person IDed was found at the crime scene and 
the stolen equipment was found in the bedroom of the person IDed and 
fingerprints matching those of the person IDed were found at the crime scene 
